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ABSTRAK 
Industri gula sampai kini masih menjadi prioritas dalam pembangunan sektor 
pertanian di Indonesia, khususnya di Jawa Timur. Tetapi, kinerja industri gula di Jawa 
Timur dalam dua dekade ini cenderung menurun, yang antara lain dapat dilihat dari 
penurunan jumlah produksi. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis ekonomi biaya transaksi 
untuk mengidentifikasi masalah industri gula di Jawa Timur. Riset ini membandingkan 
biaya transaksi antara petani tebu kontrak dan non-kontrak di Kabupaten Malang dan 
Kediri (Jawa Timur). Secara lebih detail, studi ini memperlihatkan bahwa ongkos untuk 
mengorganisasi tebang-muat-angkut (TMA) (termasuk biaya karung) berkontribusi paling 
tinggi dari total biaya transaksi petani tebu, baik berdasarkan lokasi, tipe petani, maupun 
luas lahan. Jika dianalisis lebih detail, ditemukan fakta-fakta sebagai berikut: (i) biaya 
transaksi TMA lebih besar petani tebu kontrak daripada non-kontrak; (ii) biaya komisi 
yang diberikan kepada perantara lebih besar petani tebu non-kontrak daripada kontrak; 
dan (iii) proporsi bunga kredit terhadap total biaya transaksi pada petani tebu kontrak 
cukup tinggi karena sering terjadi keterlambatan penyaluran kredit, di samping fakta 
bahwa rata-rata jumlah kredit petani tebu kontrak lebih besar ketimbang non-kontrak.  
Keywords: institutional economics, transaction costs, contract and non-contract 
sugarcane farmers, East Java 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
East Java has at least begun to attract 
some attention as an important economic 
region in its own right and as a counterweight 
to the longstanding economic dominance of 
Jakarta-West Java. East Java’s pioneer 
industries were established as early as the mid 
19th century to serve an emerging plantation 
economy (Dick, 1995:41). Trading networks 
in East Java and beyond quickly developed to 
carry the produce of the more intensive and 
diversified practice of agriculture onto the 
markets (Elson, 1984:9). West and Central 
Java also produced sugar, coffee and tobacco, 
but East Java’s output soon surpassed those 
parts of Java that had been more intensively 
exploited by the East India Company. The 
sugar industry was able through improved 
cane varieties and application of chemical 
fertilizers to boost its productivity, especially 
during the 1920s (Dick, 1995:43). Also, a high 
yield of sugar per hectare was achieved by 
intensive and efficient cultivation based on an 
excellent irrigation system, by the utilization 
of the best land in every region and, last but 
not least, by the use of superior quality cutting 
developed by the research institute maintained 
by the sugar mills (Mubyarto, 1969:40). 
Because of heavy damage to factories 
during the Revolution, post-independence 
exports never exceeded the 1954 figure of just 
212,000 tones for the whole of Java, and they 
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then rapidly fell away, ceasing altogether after 
1966. (Dick, 1995:45). In order to cope this 
problem, in April 1975 the Government issued 
Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 9/1975, 
setting up the Intensified Smallholder Cane 
(Tebu Rakyat Intensifikasi, hereafter TRI) 
programme (Mubyarto, 1977:29; Brown, 
1982:39; Isma’il, 2001:4). Briefly put, the pro-
gramme had two prime objectives: changing 
the basic structure of the industry from one in 
which the mills grew cane on land rented in 
from smallholders to one in which the 
smallholders themselves took on the entre-
preneurial role producing cane on their own 
land; and raising the nation’s total production 
of refined sugar, reducing the import bill and 
eventually achieving self sufficiency (Brown, 
1982:39; Mardjana, 1995:96).  
2 Problem Setting 
The experience of the TRI programme 
shows that individual smallholder have 
frequently not received the full benefits of the 
programme to which they are entitled (Brown, 
1982:59; Mardjana, 1995:96-97). First, farm 
size: The efficient cultivation of cane 
generally requires blocks of land at least 10 
hectares in area. With average farm sizes in 
Java of less than 0.5 ha, smallholders have had 
to find ways to amalgamate their land. Second, 
under the programme, the landholder became 
the cultivator and the mill in a sense a 
contractor to the farmer. It is in connection 
with the provision of these services that most 
of the new conflicts between landholders and 
mills have arisen, such as profit-sharing 
activity (Roesmanto, 2000:48). Third, problem 
relating with institutional setting (manage-
ment) of mills (sugar factories) that usually 
placed farmers in the marginal position, for 
example in the calculation of sugar content of 
the cane (rendement).  
In short, the recent condition of Indone-
sian sugar industry has a same situation like in 
Fiji, which what the calls “core inefficien-
cies.” The series of core inefficiencies are: (i) 
low sugarcane quality; (ii) cane burning; (iii) 
mill inefficiencies; (iv) transport inefficien-
cies; and (v) payments system to farmers 
(Snell and Prasad, 2001:261-262). Some of the 
research were conclude that sugar industry 
inefficiency is caused by lack of raw material, 
decreasing of productivity and sugar content 
(Isma’il, 2001:6-9), milling process inefficien-
cy (Martoyo, 2000:10), and sugar loss during 
cut-load-carry/TMA (Darmawan, et. al, 
2000:6). However, from their research were 
not study sugar industry inefficiency from an 
institutional economics perspective (Arum, 
2000:39), in which the factor is very likely to 
be the source of sugar industry inefficiency. 
With this background, this research focuses on 
efforts to describe and measure transaction 
costs of sugarcane farmers. Sugarcane farmers 
issue will be divided into contract (credit) and 
non-contract (non-credit) sugarcane farmers.  
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
1. Transaction Cost Economics 
The definitions of transaction costs pose 
some difficulties. The distinction between 
transaction and production costs can be 
particularly hard to make. Nevertheless, in a 
heuristic sense, the concept of transaction 
costs is very useful (Furubotn and Richter, 
1991:8). The transaction as the basic unit of 
analysis has also several definitions. Accor-
ding to Williamson (1981a:552; 1981b:1544; 
McCann and Easter, 2002:5; Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000:41), a transaction occurs when a 
good or service is transferred across a 
technological separable interface. One stage of 
activity terminates and another begins1. 
Further, Coase (1988:35) points out “if a 
workman moves from department Y to 
department X, he does not go because of a 
change in relative prices, but because he is 
                                                          
1 According to this interpretation, the term is restricted to 
situations in which resources are actually transferred in 
the physical sense of “delivery.” Such delivery may 
occur within firms or across markets. Thus, it is possible 
to speak of internal and external transactions or intrafirm 
and market transactions. They can be seen as resulting 
largely from the division of labor. See Eirik Furubotn 
and Rudolf Richter, op. cit, p. 41   
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ordered to do so.“ Finally, Commons (1932:4) 
states that “the ultimate unit of activi-
ty..…must contain in itself the three principles 
of conflict, mutually, and order. This unit is a 
transaction” (as quoted by Beckmann, 
2000:10).  
Economic literature provides diverse 
definitions of transaction costs, with most of 
the authors relying on definitions that suit 
their theoretical conceptualizations and/or are 
relevant to their empirical cases. What there-
fore Coase had initially generally identified as 
“costs of organizing transactions,” has been 
re-examined and re-conceptualized to reflect 
transactions costs incurred in specific situa-
tions. For example, Coase later used transac-
tion costs to re-conceptualize the problem of 
externalities and had to include the aspect of 
“co-ordinating human interaction” to his 
earlier definition. Other than this problem of 
diversity, some definitions are also very 
general and would therefore be difficult to 
apply in empirical cases. Examples here 
include definitions like Williamson pointed 
out that “the costs of running the economic 
system”, and “costs of adapting to a change in 
circumstances”, etc (Dorfman, 1981; Challen, 
2000; as quoted by Mburu, 2002:41). Further, 
North (1991:203) defined transaction costs are 
the costs of specifying and enforcing the 
contracts that underlie exchange and therefore 
comprise all the costs of political and 
economic organization that permit economies 
to capture the gains from trade. 
Shortly, transaction costs are the costs of 
negotiating, measuring, and enforcing 
exchanges.2 Negotiating an agreement can be 
a long and costly process. All sides to the 
                                                          
2 As quoted by Mburu, transaction costs can also be 
defined to include three broad categories of costs. These 
are: (1) search and information costs; (2) bargaining and 
decision or contracting costs, and (3) monitoring, 
enforcement and compliance costs. See John Mburu, 
Collaborative Management of Wildlife in Kenya: An 
Empirical Analysis of Stakeholders’ Participation, 
Costs and Incentives, Socioeconomic Studies on Rural 
Development, Vol. 130, Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk Kiel 
KG, Germany, 2002, p. 42 
exchange must bargain with one another even 
when they are in bitter opposition. Labor 
unions and management must negotiate new 
contracts periodically. Sometimes the process 
is so difficult that mediators must be brought 
in to facilitate the discussions. Measurement 
costs involve measuring all the attributes of a 
good or service. The root source of measu-
rement costs is poor information. For example, 
when purchasing a computer, the buyer would 
like to know a lot more about the computer’s 
attributes than simply the price. Finally, 
transaction costs include the costs of enforcing 
exchanges. Differences in enforcement costs 
across countries may be the single most im-
portant reason why some nations are wealthy 
and others are poor (Yeager, 1999:26-27).  
Furubotn and Richter (as quoted by 
Benham and Benham, 2000:368) pointed out 
typical examples of transaction costs are the 
costs of using the market (market transaction 
costs) and the costs of exercising the right to 
give orders within the firm (managerial 
transaction costs). There is also the array of 
costs associated with the running and 
adjusting of the institutional framework of a 
polity (political transaction costs). For each of 
these three types of transaction costs, it is 
possible to recognize two variants: (1) “fixed” 
transaction costs, that is, the specific 
investments made in setting up institutional 
arrangements; and (2) “variable” transaction 
costs, that is, costs that depend on the number 
or volume of transactions. 
The costs of using the market (market 
transaction costs) may be classified in more 
detail as follows: (1) the costs of preparing 
contracts (search and information costs 
narrowly defined),3 (2) the costs of concluding 
contracts (costs of bargaining and decision 
                                                          
3 These costs may arise because individuals make direct 
outlays (on advertising, visit to prospective customers, 
and so on), or costs can arise indirectly through the 
creation of organized markets (stock exchanges, fairs, 
weekly markets, and so on). Also included are costs of 
communication among the prospective parties to the 
exchange (such as postage, telephone expenses, and 
outlays on sales representatives).    
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making),4 and (3) the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing the contractual obligations.5 Mana-
gerial transaction costs reduce to the 
following: (1) the costs of setting up, main-
taining or changing an organizational design. 
Such costs relate to a rather wide array of 
operations.6 These are typically fixed transac-
tion costs; and (2) the costs of running an 
organization, which fall largely into two 
subcategories: (a) information costs;7 and (b) 
the costs associated with the physical transfer 
of goods and services across a separable 
interface.8 Finally, political transaction costs 
deals with the provision of such organization 
and the public goods associated with it. They 
are, in a general sense, the costs of supplying 
public goods by collective action, and they can 
be understood as analogous to managerial 
transaction costs. Specifically, these are: (1) 
the costs of setting up, maintaining and 
changing a system’s formal and informal 
political organization;9 (2) the costs of 
running polity. These are current expenditures 
for those things formerly specified as the 
                                                          
4 Costs in this category relate to the outlays that must be 
made when a contract is being written and the 
concerned parties must bargain and negotiate over its 
provisions. Decision costs include the costs of making 
any information gathered usable, the compensation paid 
to advisers, the costs of reaching decisions within 
groups, and so on.  
5 These costs arise because of the need to monitor the 
agreed upon delivery times, measure product quality 
and amounts, and so on.  
6 There are costs of personnel management, investments 
in information technology, defense against takeovers, 
public relations, and lobbying. 
7 The costs of decision making, monitoring the execution 
of orders, and measuring the performance of workers, 
agency costs, costs of information management, and so 
on 
8 Examples are the costs of idle time in the handling of 
semifinished products, the costs of intrafirm transport, 
and so on. 
9  Included here are the costs associated with the 
establishment of the legal framework, the administrative 
structure, the military, the educational system, the 
judiciary, and so on 
“duties of the sovereign”10 (Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000:44-47).  
The transaction costs literature has 
identified three costs that are particularly 
important (Dietrich, 1994:21). First, there is 
the cost of thinking about all the different 
eventualities that occur during the course of 
the contractual relationship, and planning how 
to deal with them. Second, there is the cost of 
negotiating with others about these plans. 
Third, there is the cost of writing down the 
plans in such a way that they can be enforced 
by a third party –such as a judge- in the event 
of a dispute (Hart, 1995:680). In more detail, 
ex-ante11 transaction costs are the costs of 
drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an 
agreement. Ex-post12 transaction costs 
include: (1) the maladaptation costs incurred 
when transactions drift out of alignment with 
requirements, (2) the haggling costs incurred 
if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post 
misalignments, (3) the set-up and running 
costs associated with the governance 
structures (often not the courts) to which the 
disputes are referred, and (4) the bonding costs 
of effecting secure commitments.13  
                                                          
10 Involved are current outlays for legislation, defense, the 
administration of justice, transport, and education.  
11 Ex ante problem occur when one party to a transaction 
has less information about a potential purchase/sale 
than the other, but this information disadvantage is 
eliminated after the transaction is completed. See 
Michael Dietrich, Transaction Cost Economics and 
Beyond: Towards a New Economics of the Firm, 
Routledge, New York, 1994, p. 20   
12 Ex post information asymmetries occur when one party 
of transaction has less information than another even 
after the transaction has occurred. See Michael 
Dietrich, ibid, p. 20 
13 In a survey of transaction costs literature, Alchian and 
Woodward (1988) transcend these differences by 
distinguishing between two types of transactions: 
exchange transactions involving the transfer of 
property rights, and contracting transactions involving 
negotiating and enforcing promises about performance. 
See Margareth M. Polski, Measuring Transaction Cost 
and Institutional Change in U.S. Commercial Banking 
Industry, Paper presented for the Annual Conference of 
the International Society for New Institutional 
Economics 2000 in Tübingen - Germany, 2001, p. 10-
11 
2008 Yustika 
 
287 
The two behavioral assumptions on which 
transaction cost analysis relies –and without 
which the study of economic organization is 
pointless- are bounded rationality14 and 
opportunistic behaviour15 (Williamson, 
1981b:1545), which manifests itself as adverse 
selection, moral hazard, cheating, shirking, 
and other forms of strategic behavior, to 
explain contractual choice and the ownership 
structure of firms.16 In Williamson’s 
framework, a trade-off has to be made 
between the costs of coordination and 
hierarchy within an organization, and the costs 
of transacting and forming contracts in the 
market. This trade-off will depend on the 
magnitude of transaction costs. The ease or 
                                                          
14 Bounded rationality refers to rate and storage limits on 
the capacities of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, 
and process information without error. See Oliver E. 
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some 
Elementary Considerations, The American Economic 
Journal, Vol. 63, Issue 2, 1973, p. 317. The bounded 
rationality concept is based on two principles: (i) 
individuals, or groups of individuals, have inevitable 
limits on their abilities to process or use information 
that is available. This limited computational capacity 
exists because of difficulties in understanding and 
manipulating the sense data involved in any but trivial 
situations. In short informational complexity exists; (ii) 
is equally implausible to suggest that all possible states 
of the world and all relevant cause-effect relationships 
can be identified, following which, probabilities can be 
calculated, presumably on the basis of previous 
occurrence. This implies that economic actors are 
inevitable faced with incomplete information, i.e. 
informational uncertainty exists. See Michael Dietrich, 
op. cit, p. 19 
15 Opportunism is an effort to realize individual gains 
through a lack of candor or honesty in transactions. 
Returns attributable to productive advantages (e.g., a 
unique location or differential skill) are not to be 
regarded as opportunistic. Strategic representations are 
required for opportunism to obtain. See Oliver E. 
Williamson, ibid. p. 317 
16 Among the factors on which there appears to be 
developing a general consensus are: (i) opportunism is 
a central concept in the study of transaction costs; (ii) 
opportunism is especially important for economic 
activity that involves transaction-specific investments 
in human and physical capital; (iii) the efficient 
processing of information is an important and related 
concept; and (iv) the assessment of transaction costs is 
a comparative institutional undertaking. See Oliver E. 
Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The 
Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 22, No.2, 1979, p. 234 
difficulty of contracting, and the types of 
contract made are determined by the level and 
nature of transaction costs which are 
influenced by the extent of imperfect 
information involved in making a transaction. 
Central to transaction costs economics is the 
costliness of information. TCE seeks to 
understand the interplay between institutional 
factors and market and non-market exchange 
under positive transaction costs (Kherallah 
and Kirsten, 2001:12-13). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1 Research Design 
1.1 Research Location 
The survey was carried out in two 
different regions in East Java - Indonesia, i.e. 
Malang and Kediri Districts. The research 
locations were purposely determined. They 
represent regions which more or less have 
some similarity to the aspects of the 
agricultural farming system. From the 
sugarcane production point of view, Malang 
and Kediri Districts are the biggest producers 
of sugarcane in East Java, both of them 
contributing around 28.76% of the total 
sugarcane production in East Java. Yet, 
Malang and Kediri Districts, chosen as 
locations for this research, are also relatively 
attractive regions (from an economic point of 
view) compared with other districts in East 
Java. This is due to their location adjacent to 
the provincial capital of East Java, which is 
Surabaya. Malang and Kediri Districts are 
about 90 and 150 km, respectively, from 
Surabaya. The rapid economic development in 
Surabaya has had many implications for 
economic growth in Malang and Kediri 
Districts. 
1.2  Selection of Samples 
This research used stratified random 
sampling to obtain a comprehensive 
description for all of the research objectives. 
Stratified samples require the population to be 
segmented into homogeneous sub-populations, 
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with random samples drawn independently 
from each segment (Maxim, 1999:133). The 
stratified random sampling approach has the 
advantage of ensuring that specific groups 
(strata) are included proportionally in the 
sample. Study on the sugarcane farmers’ level 
was separated into two kinds of sugarcane 
farmers, i.e. contract and non-contract 
sugarcane farmers. The number of sugarcane 
farmer samples taken was 120 respondents in 
two districts (30 samples for each kind of 
sugarcane farmer), i.e. Malang and Kediri 
Districts. 
3.2 Research Methods 
2.1 Data Sources  
The research used source of primary data. 
Primary data was collected by using a 
questionnaire through face-to-face interviews 
of a number of respondents.17 Interviewing 
some respondents is the main method of 
obtaining primary data from the sugarcane 
farmers. In addition, individual in-depth 
interviews are also taken to obtain more 
detailed information. The person interviewed 
was free to voice his/her own expressions/ 
ideas in an unstructured interview. The inter-
viewer relied on open questions to introduce 
topics of interest without the interviewer 
imposing his ideas. Also, the researcher used 
key informants to collect information.18 The 
                                                          
17 Face-to-face interviews have at least three advantages: 
(i) they can be used with people who could not 
otherwise provide information –respondents who are 
illiterate, blind, bedridden, or very old, for example; (ii) 
if a respondent does not understand a question in a 
personal interview, you can fill in, and, if you sense 
that the respondent is not answering fully, you can 
probe for more complete data; and (iii) personal 
interviews at home can be much longer than telephone 
or self-administered questionnaires. See H. Russell 
Bernard, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches, Sage Publications, Inc., 
Thousand Oaks, California, 2000, p. 230 
18 Perhaps the single most important diagnostic feature of 
good qualitative enquiry is its full exploitation of 
insights from key informants. By key informants we 
mean persons whose position or previous experience 
gives them particularly valuable information on a give 
topic. If the basis is position, the key informant 
becomes, in effect, a surrogate observer for the 
survey of sugarcane farmers will be used as a 
source to gather information on any problems, 
such as contract systems and input sources.  
2.2  Method of Analysis 
In general, the researcher used both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The 
researcher used qualitative analysis methods 
to describe the institutional arrangements of 
the sugar industry in Indonesia. Problems with 
institutional settings will be also be explored. 
The objective of the qualitative analysis was 
to get an inside perspective of the economic 
participants on the process of establishing 
contractual arrangements in the sugar industry. 
On the other hand, quantitative analysis 
methods, for example frequency distribution 
tables, were used to analyze some empirical 
data. All the data in the household ques-
tionnaires was processed to SPSS after being 
re-checked by the author. A section of the 
questionnaires contained semi-structured 
questions as a guideline for collecting infor-
mation on reasons, opinions, comments, and 
responses about the institutional arrangements 
in the sugar industry. From these two 
methods, it is anticipated that a more 
comprehensive picture of the institutional 
background of the sugar industry in Indonesia 
will be obtained. The combination of the two 
analyses will significantly bridge the gap 
between macro and micro types of analyses, 
which happen quite frequently.  
3.3 Measuring Transaction Costs 
3.1   Measuring Transaction Costs of Sugar-
cane Farmers 
In the case of sugarcane farmers, the 
transaction costs’ variables can be classified 
into the components as follows: (i) market 
                                                                            
investigator. On the other hand, if the basis is 
experience, the informant provides the investigator 
with a chance to view information from other sources 
in historical perspective –in effect a longitudinal ‘time 
slice’. See Jon Moris and James Copestake, Qualitative 
Enquiry for Rural Development, Intermediate 
Technology Publications on Behalf of the Overseas 
Development Institute, 1993, London, p. 58  
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transaction costs (cooperative fee and 
donation, SPTA/letter of delivery order fee, 
middleman fee, interest rate, interest margin, 
paperwork, opportunity cost, and credit 
delay); (ii) managerial transaction costs (cut-
load-carry and sack costs); and (iii) political 
transaction costs (land tax). In addition, some 
variables still exist in transaction costs of 
sugarcane farmers, like costs of security, 
village donation/tax, making a contract, cere-
monial meal cost, and group fee. However, 
because only a few sugarcane farmers spent 
money on those variables, the variables are not 
involved in this analysis. In general, most of 
the variables are explicit (which means that 
farmers have the data), so it is not difficult to 
measure transaction costs. However, some 
variables, like paperwork, opportunity cost, 
and credit delay must be approached with 
special measurements, because farmers 
usually do not calculate these variables 
(implicit). In detail, the measurement of 
sugarcane farmers’ transaction costs can be 
explained as follows: 
 Land tax = Legal land tax paid to (local) 
government every year (explicit). 
 Cut-load-carry = Costs incurred by 
sugarcane farmers to organize cut-load-
carry activities (TMA), including costs of 
truck rented, sugar mill operations, and 
wage/meal/cigarette of truck drivers. For 
contract sugarcane farmers, this cost can be 
seen from the sugar mill report that is 
given to farmers (explicit). 
 Sack = Costs incurred by sugarcane 
farmers to purchase the sacks, usually in 
the sugar mill report given to farmers 
(explicit). 
 Cooperative fee and donation = Regular 
cooperative donation (each month) and 
contribution payment (one time only); and 
also illegal fees paid to the cooperative in 
the form of commission and credit cutting 
(this data comes from interview with 
farmers) (explicit). 
 SPTA fee = Payments to obtain SPTA 
(letter of delivery order) from sugar mill 
officer (explicit). 
 Interest rate = Interest rate paid to coope-
rative (for TRKs/contract farmers) based 
on government decision (16%/year) or 
middleman (for TRMs/non-contract 
farmers) (explicit). 
 Interest margin = Payments to cooperative 
based on interest margin between govern-
ment decision and cooperative arrange-
ment, including margin of sugar yield-
share (explicit). 
 Middleman fee = Costs incurred by non-
contract sugarcane farmers to middleman 
to process their sugarcane at sugar mill 
(explicit). 
 Paperwork = Cost of completing all the 
forms required by the cooperative/sugar 
mill, including photocopies of documents, 
pictures, and others. Commonly, sugarcane 
farmers do not calculate paperwork expen-
diture. However, by assuming conserva-
tively, the costs for paperwork (as a 
requirement to make a contract), including 
photocopies of documents, pictures, elabo-
ration of personal documents, and others, 
add up to approximately Rp 50,000 for 
sugarcane farmers who get credit from a 
cooperative/sugar mill. These transaction 
costs are only for contract sugarcane 
farmers (implicit). 
 Opportunity cost = Cost of the time needed 
to gather all the information required by 
the cooperative/sugar mill. The opportunity 
costs equal approximately Rp 35,000/ 
sugarcane farmer. This calculation comes 
from: (i) contract farmers need at least two 
days to gather all the information required 
by the cooperative/sugar mill, and if we 
compare this to their average wage rate as 
a laborer in a farm field (Rp 15,000/day), 
then the opportunity cost for gathering 
information is Rp 30,000/contract farmers; 
and (ii) transportation cost to go to the 
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cooperative/sugar mill is Rp 5,000 
(implicit). 
 Credit delay = Cost of not obtaining the 
credit immediately (especially for contract 
farmers). Not obtaining the credit imme-
diately can cost 10% of sugarcane farmers’ 
income. About 40% of contract farmers 
said that they always received credit not on 
time (as late as two months from the 
agreement). In this sense, it is rather diffi-
cult to say exactly the amount of opportu-
nity costs. However, the research used 
special measurements to calculate the 
opportunity costs. Because of the lateness 
of receiving credit usually sugarcane 
farmers are also delayed in giving fertilizer 
to their sugarcane plants. Some farmers 
said that the two months’ lateness of 
fertilizing caused a decrease of 10% in 
their sugarcane. Therefore, the opportunity 
costs of contract farmers are estimated to 
be 10% of contract farmers’ income 
(implicit). 
3.2  Limitations of Measuring Transaction 
Costs  
The limitations of this research have to do 
with the difficulty of measuring some data. At 
the level of sugarcane farmers, transaction 
costs have not yet been calculated for these 
components: (1) repaksasi, by which the sugar 
mill is permitted to deduct the farmers’ 
revenues if the farmers’ sugarcane is regarded 
as mixed or dirty (soil, leaf, and so on). But, 
the sugar mill conducts this valuation in a 
unilateral way so that it has potential to 
disadvantage sugarcane farmers; (ii) 
decreasing weight of sugarcane volume. 
Sugarcane farmers cannot control this process 
because all processes are done by the sugar 
mill; (iii) transportation from truck to lorry 
(transportation tools are owned by the sugar 
mill). Many sugarcanes often fall to the 
ground as a result of the transporting process 
so that it reduces the weight of farmers’ 
sugarcane; (iv) transaction cost in the form of 
hidden deductions from the cooperative. For 
example, deduction of transportation costs and 
cutting fees from cooperatives is not detailed 
so that there is potential to put sugarcane 
farmers at a disadvantage; and (v) transaction 
cost in the form of decreasing sugar content 
(rendement/sucrose) as a result of the indo-
lence of the sugar mill in milling sugarcane. 
Sugarcane milled 24 hours after being cut, 
according to sugar mills, will decrease the 
sugar content by 1%. Therefore, total 
transaction costs calculated in this research are 
actually lower than the real ones. 
RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH 
1. Sugarcane Farmers’ Transaction Costs 
Several kinds of requirements directly 
related to sugarcane farmers’ activities were 
identified from the contracts, and are 
classified into three groups, i.e. market, 
managerial, and political transaction costs. It 
is important to note that the transaction costs 
included in this analysis are only those 
directly related to the economic exchange 
(transfer of property rights) between 
sugarcane farmers (contract and non-contract 
farmers) and other economic actors, namely 
cooperatives, middlemen, and sugar mills. 
However, to calculate the effective transaction 
costs it was necessary to have access to the 
archives of the institutions. For example, a 
researcher needs to have access to 
cooperatives’ annual financial reports to get 
the actual transaction costs on some variables, 
like differences of seed/fertilizer price 
between cooperatives and shops/retailers. 
Unfortunately, all cooperatives were reluctant 
to allow access to their archives. Therefore, 
some transaction costs variables could not be 
accounted in this research. As a result, the real 
transaction costs could be even greater than 
those calculated.  
Based on the definitions, in the case of 
sugarcane farmers, the transaction costs can be 
classified into the components as follows 
(summary can be seen in Table 1): land and 
village taxes, cut-load-carry (TMA) and sack, 
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cooperative fee and donation, farmers groups 
donation, SPTA (letter of delivery order) fee, 
middleman fee, making contract, ceremonial 
meal, credit interest,19 interest margin, paper-
work,20 opportunity cost,21 and credit delay.22 
                                                          
19  Interest rate is included in the transaction costs because 
its reflects the sugarcane farmers’ cost to get credit. 
With this conception, interest margin of interest rate, 
paperwork, opportunity costs of credit, and credit 
lateness are also included as transaction costs. In the 
case of banking, interest expense is a direct indicator of 
the external costs of the way banking firms organize 
their activities are situated on all interest bearing 
liabilities, and is affected by monetary policy, pricing 
regulation, pricing competition, and internal funds 
management practices. See Margaret M. Polski, 
Measuring Transaction Costs and Institutional Change 
in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry, Paper 
presented for the Annual Conference of the 
International Society for New Institutional Economics, 
2000, Tübingen, Germany, p.17  
20  Commonly, sugarcane farmers do not calculate paper-
work expenditure. However, by assuming conserva-
tively, the costs for paperwork (as a requirement to 
make a contract), including photocopies of documents, 
pictures, elaboration of personal documents, and other 
costs Rp 50,000/for sugarcane farmers who get credit 
from a cooperative/sugar mill (contract farmers). These 
transaction costs are only for contract sugarcane 
farmers. 
21  The opportunity cost of time ‘invested’ in loan 
processing is another important component of 
borrowers’ overall transaction costs. The aim is to 
measure the opportunity cost in such a way as to 
compare its extent to the monetary cost components. In 
the literature, the opportunity cost of time is often 
valued at the daily wage rate (e.g. Adams and Nehman, 
1979) or the daily minimum wage established by law. 
See Wolfram Erhardt, Financial Markets for Small 
Enterprises in Urban and Rural Northern Thailand, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, p. 168. In the 
case of sugarcane farmers, the calculation of 
opportunity cost comes from two things: (i) contract 
farmers need at least two days to gather all the 
information required by the cooperative/sugar mill; 
then if we compare the regional minimum wage 
(UMR) amount Rp 15,000/day, the opportunity cost to 
gather information is Rp 30,000/contract farmers; and 
(ii) transportation costs to go to the cooperative/sugar 
mill are Rp 5,000. Transportation costs are quoted 
using the cost for public or private transport (cars or 
motorbikes). Therefore, total opportunity costs are Rp 
35,000/sugarcane farmer.   
22  The costs of not obtaining the credit immediately 
(especially for contract farmers) is 10% of the 
sugarcane farmers’ income. In this sense, it is rather 
difficult to say exactly the amount of opportunity costs. 
However, this research used special measurements to 
compute the opportunity costs. Because of the delay in 
With Collins and Fabozzi’s formula, land and 
village taxes are included among (fixed/taxes) 
transaction costs; and cooperative donation & 
fee, making contract, SPTA fee, farmers group 
donation, middleman fee are included (fixed/ 
commissions and transfer fees) among tran-
saction costs. Based on the Williamsons’ 
definition, TMA and sack are included as 
(managerial) transaction costs (and together 
with credit interest, interest margin, and credit 
delay are considered as variable costs). In all 
variables, every kind of sugarcane farmer has 
his/her own characteristics. For example, 
contract farmers do not pay costs for SPTA 
fee and payment to farmers union. On the 
contrary, non-contract farmers usually must 
pay a fee to join other farmers who have 
SPTA. Also, there are sugarcane farmers who 
spend money for the ceremonial meal in the 
early planting or after harvest, but there are 
many sugarcane farmers who do not. 
 
 
                                                                            
receiving credit usually sugarcane farmers are also late 
in giving fertilizer to their sugarcane plants. Some 
farmers said that the two month delay (usually credit 
comes late two months after the agreement) of 
fertilizer decreases sugarcane productivity by 10%. 
Therefore, the opportunity costs of contract farmers are 
calculated as 10% of contract farmers’ income. 
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Table 1. Transaction Costs’ Variables of Sugarcane Farmers 
Variables Description Expenditure 
Land tax Legal land tax paid to government every one year  Explicit 
Cut-load-carry (TMA) Costs incurred by sugarcane farmers to organize cut-
load-carry activities (TMA), including costs of truck 
rent, sugar mill operations, and wage/meal/cigarette of 
truck drivers 
Explicit 
Sack Costs incurred by sugarcane farmers to purchase the 
sacks 
Explicit 
Security Costs incurred by sugarcane farmers to hire security 
(mandor tebang) during harvest period 
Explicit 
Cooperative fee and 
donation 
Regular cooperative donation (each month) and 
contribution payment (only one time) 
Explicit 
Credit interest  Interest rate paid to cooperative (for contract 
farmers)/middleman (for non-contract farmers) based 
on government decision 
Explicit 
Village tax Legal taxes paid to village, including water tax (PAM), 
street tax (DLLAJR), mosque donation, etc. 
Explicit 
 
Making contract 
Cost of completing contract with cooperative 
(KUD)/sugar mill, including cost of administration, 
notary, commission, and credit deduction 
Explicit 
SPTA fee Payments to obtain SPTA (letter of delivery order), 
including auction cost 
Explicit 
Ceremonial meal cost Costs incurred by sugarcane farmers to hold ceremonial 
meal, usually in early planting or harvesting  
Explicit 
Interest margin Payments to cooperative based on interest margin 
between government decision and cooperative 
arrangement, including margin of sugar yield-share 
Implicit 
Farmers groups 
donation 
Legal and illegal fees paid to farmers group, including 
donation to head of group 
Explicit 
 
KUD fee Illegal fees paid to cooperative in form of commission 
and credit cutting  
Implicit 
Middleman fee Costs incurred by sugarcane farmers (non-contract 
farmers) to middleman to process their sugarcane to 
sugar mill  
Explicit 
 
Paperwork Cost of completing all the forms required by 
cooperative/sugar mill, including photocopies of 
documents, pictures, and others 
Implicit 
Opportunity costs Cost of the time needed to gather all the information 
required by the cooperative/sugar mill 
Implicit 
Credit delay Cost of not obtaining the credit immediately (especially 
for contract farmers) 
Implicit 
Source: Processed primary data 
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Table 2 describes the contribution of each 
variable to total transaction costs. Cost of cut-
loading-carry (TMA, including sack cost) 
gives the highest contribution to total 
transaction cost, based on the location, type of 
farmers, and land size. Contribution of this 
TMA reaches almost 70% of total transaction 
costs. The second highest contributor to 
transaction cost is the middleman fee, which 
averages nearly 16% of total transaction costs. 
Only contract farmers do not pay the 
middleman fee because they have been bound 
by contract with a cooperative/sugar mill so 
that they do not need middlemen. Three 
variables, namely credit interest, interest 
margin and SPTA fee, are not or somewhat 
high contributors to total transaction costs 
with 3-6%. The variables land tax and 
cooperative fee and donation only make small 
contributions to total transaction costs. 
Altogether these four variables only contribute 
less than 3% to transaction costs. 
If analyzed in detail, the facts are as 
follows: (i) the highest percentage of TMA 
cost is paid by contract farmers and the 
smallest by non-contract farmers. This is 
because TMA activities on contract farmers 
are handled by sugar mills whose enforcement 
often involves manipulation, for example 
transportation cost and labor wage, which 
sugarcane farmers cannot control; (ii) the 
biggest middleman fee is paid by non-contract 
farmers and reaches more than 17%; contract 
farmers are not burdened with the middleman 
fee. Non-contract farmers need middlemen 
because they do not have contracts with sugar 
 
Table 2. Variables’ Contribution to Transaction Costs/ha Based on the Location, Type of 
Farmers and Land Size (Rp 000, %) 
Variables Malang Kediri TRKs TRMs > 2 ha  2 ha 
Land tax 
 
60 
(1.8) 
53 
(1.1) 
56 
(1.4) 
57 
(1.3) 
49 
(1.1) 
75 
(1.7) 
TMA and sack costs 
 
2,504 
(74.4) 
3,438 
(71.8) 
3,024 
(74.7) 
2,942 
(67.3) 
2,943 
(68.3) 
3,096 
(71.1) 
Cooperative fee & 
donation  
38 
(1.1) 
22 
(0.5) 
38 
(1.0) 
40 
(0.9) 
42 
(1.0) 
33 
(0.7) 
Credit interest1 
 
199 
(5.9) 
314 
(6.6) 
636 
(15.7) 
224 
(5.1) 
247 
(5.7) 
262 
(6.0) 
SPTA fee 
 
134 
(4.0) - 
148 
(3.7) 
148 
(3.4) 
154 
(3.6) 
108 
(2.6) 
Interest margin2 
 
11 
(0.3) 
156 
(3.2) 
139 
(3.5) 
224 
(5.1) 
150 
(3.5) 
150 
(3.4) 
Middleman fee 
 
420 
(12.5) 
803 
(16.8) - 
739 
(16.9) 
722 
(16.8) 
631 
(14.5) 
Total 3,364 (100.0) 
4,787 
(100.0) 
4,042 
(100.0) 
4,372 
(100.0) 
4,303 
100.0 
4,354 
(100.0) 
Note:  Variables of security, village donation/tax, making contract, ceremonial meal cost, and group fee 
is not involved in this table because the number of sugarcane farmers who spent on these variables 
is small. 
1 Credit interest includes costs of paperwork, opportunity costs, and credit delay in the  
  case of contract farmers. 
2 Interest margins include cost of sugar yield-share margin.  
Source: Processed primary data 
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mills. This middleman fee is divided into two 
kinds: molasses taken by middleman or money 
paid by non-contract farmers for every quintal 
of sugar milled by sugar mill; (iii) proportion 
(amount) of credit interest to total transaction 
costs for contract farmers is very high (15%) 
because of the costs of paperwork, 
opportunity, and credit delay.33 Therefore, 
although credit interest for non-contract 
farmers is very high, because they do not bear 
costs of paperwork, opportunity, and credit 
delay, the total percentage (amount) of their 
credit interest is lower than that for contract 
farmers; and (iv) although theoretically SPTA 
is given without charge by a cooperative/sugar 
mill to sugar farmers, in fact most farmers still 
have to pay the SPTA, especially in Malang 
District. Farmers usually buy SPTA as much 
as sugar owned, where for every quintal of 
sugar they must pay Rp 500. 
Furthermore, when the percentage of 
contribution to the transaction costs is diffe-
rentiated based on types of transaction costs, 
i.e. market, managerial, and political transac-
tion costs, then the proportion of contribution 
is dominated by managerial transaction cost 
(around 70%). From the variables above, only 
land tax (including village and street taxes) is 
categorized as a political transaction cost, with 
a less significant contribution (<1.5%). When 
the analysis is differentiated based on the type 
                                                          
33  Although paperwork, opportunity, and credit delay 
costs are excluded from credit interest variables, the 
percentage (amount) of credit interest for contract 
farmers is still higher than that for non-contract 
farmers. This happens because the average amount of 
credit that was borrowed by contract farmers is higher 
than that for non-contract farmers, i.e. Rp 4.5 million 
and Rp 2.4 million, respectively. 
of sugarcane farmers, then the managerial 
transaction’s proportion for contract farmers is 
higher than that for non-contract farmers. This 
happens because TMA (cut-load-carry) activi-
ties of contract farmers are organized by sugar 
mills whose enforcement often involves 
manipulation, for example transportation costs 
which contract farmers cannot control (Table 
3). On the contrary, the proportion of market 
transaction costs for non-contract farmers is 
higher than that for contract farmers because 
non-contract farmers must pay a middleman 
fee. 
In general, there are some interesting 
findings about transaction costs (Table 4). 
First, if the analysis is based on the location, 
then the transaction costs/ha in Kediri District 
are higher than those in Malang District, both 
for land size of 2 ha and >2 ha. There are at 
least five reasons for this finding: (i) almost all 
molasses (tetes) of non-contract farmers in 
Kediri District is taken by middlemen, so that 
the molasses loss is included in the transaction 
costs; (ii) credit management and information 
are handled by only one cooperative 
(KUB/Koperasi Usaha Bersama) in Kediri 
District, while in Malang District they are 
handled by many cooperatives so that 
manipulation can be avoided; (iii) in practice, 
SPTA in Kediri District is more difficult to get 
so that farmers must pay some fee to get it (in 
cooperation with other farmers), while in 
Malang District SPTA is easier to get because 
there are many cooperatives; (iv) sugar 
content determination in Ngadiredjo Sugar 
Mill (Kediri District) is less transparent as 
compared to Kebon Agung Sugar Mill 
(Malang District), due to the system of equal 
Table 3: Type of Transaction Costs Based on the Type of Farmers (%) 
No Type of Transaction Costs TRKs TRMs 
1 Market transaction costs 23.7 30.6 
2 Managerial transaction costs 74.7 68.1 
3 Political transaction costs           1.6           1.3 
4 Total       100.0       100.0 
            Source: Processed primary data 
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treatment for all sugarcane farmers; and (v) 
transportation cost is higher in Kediri District 
because their productivity/ha is higher 
(resulting in higher total production). 
If the analysis is based on the farmers’ 
type, then the transaction costs/ha for non-
contract farmers is a bit higher than for 
contract farmers, especially for those who 
have land >2 ha. The high non-contract 
farmers’ transaction costs result from the fact 
that they receive no assurance that their 
sugarcane will be milled by a sugar mill. 
Therefore, non-contract farmers have to ask 
for middlemen or other sugarcane farmers 
who have SPTA to enter their sugarcane in the 
sugar mill. If they use a middleman service, 
non-contract farmers will not get molasses 
because all of it is taken by middlemen as 
compensation for their service entering their 
sugarcane to sugar mill. If non-contract 
farmers use the service of other sugarcane 
farmers who have SPTA, payment is based on 
the weight of sugarcane milled (usually non-
contract farmers must pay Rp 5000/quintal). 
Besides, non-contract farmers also have to pay 
high interest (40%) to get loans from 
middlemen during sugarcane planting time. 
This makes non-contract farmers’ transaction 
cost higher than contract farmers, although 
they do not interact with many institutions, 
like cooperatives and sugar mills.  
Further, the high transaction costs for 
contract farmers are caused by many 
‘manipulative practices,’ both at cooperatives 
and sugar mills, such as illegally high interest 
rates, low sugar content valuation, fees paid to 
cooperatives, higher price of seed/fertilizer, 
obscure deduction of transportation costs, and 
so on.34 With this description, it can be 
concluded that the institution of contract 
                                                          
34  For example, cooperatives often take advantage of 
sugarcane farmers who do not understand (asymmetric 
information) in various ways, for example, by 
increasing seed/fertilizer price and cutting sugarcane 
income to return credit. Almost every income report 
received by sugarcane farmers from a cooperative is 
not accompanied by detailed explanation, but only 
explains about total income received and payment paid 
by farmers. With this condition, of course, sugarcane 
farmers do not know whether there is manipulation or 
not in the report made by the cooperative. This survey 
shows that there are even many sugarcane farmers who 
do not know how much seed or fertilizer was bought 
from cooperatives (through credit), so that cooperatives 
can easily manipulate the payment (cutting) of the 
credit (seed/fertilizer).  This practice can be conducted 
by cooperative because, unfortunately, it is not easy to 
get accurate data, both because cooperative 
management is not transparent and because sugarcane 
farmers do not know exactly the amount of 
seed/fertilizer that they bought (credited). However, all 
of these are transaction costs that are charges to 
sugarcane farmers. 
Tabel 4:  Sugarcane Farmers’ Transaction Costs Based  on the Location and Type of  Farmers 
(Rp 000) 
Malang District Kediri District 
Transaction Costs (TC)  2 ha > 2 ha  2 ha > 2 ha 
Average TC  3,083 11,574 6,530 16,980 
Average TC/ha 2,835 2,944 4,138 4,227 
Percentage of TC/ha  2,890 
(40.9%) 
4,183 
(59.1%) 
TRKs TRMs 
Transaction Costs (TC)  2 ha > 2 ha  2 ha > 2 ha 
Average TC 7,294 13,938 4,721 13,527 
Average TC/ha 3,799 3,569 3,645 3,758 
Percentage of TC/ha  3,684 
(49.9%) 
3,701 
(50.1%) 
Source: Processed primary data 
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farmers is better than the institution of non-
contract farmers, but because of the low 
bargaining position of sugarcane farmers in 
facing the cooperative/sugar mill, there are 
many chances for manipulation. This is the 
point that must be improved if the 
government, in the long term, still wants to 
continue its credit grant program to farmers. 
Second, if the analysis is not averaged per 
hectare, the research shows that transaction 
costs will be higher as the land size increases, 
based both on the location and farmers’ type. 
As with production costs, the reason is that 
there are higher variable costs, which result 
from increasing the land size (total 
production), such as transportation costs, sack 
purchase, and food/cigarette for drivers. This 
is why the transaction costs for sugarcane 
farmers with more land are higher than for 
those with less land (2 ha). Another finding 
is that the percentage of transaction costs of 
sugarcane farmers in Kediri District are higher 
than transaction costs in Malang District, that 
is 59.1% compared with 40.9%. This applied 
both to sugarcane farmers who have more land 
(>2 ha) and those who have less land (2 ha). 
The reason is the same with the above 
explanation: (i) almost all molasses (tetes) of 
non-contract farmers in Kediri District is taken 
by middlemen, so that the molasses loss is 
included in the transaction costs; (ii) in 
practice, SPTA in Kediri District is more 
difficult to get so that farmers must pay a fee 
to get it (cooperate with other farmers), while 
in Malang District SPTA is easier to get 
because there are many cooperatives; and (iii) 
transportation costs are higher in Kediri 
District because their productivity/ha is higher 
than in Malang District.  
In the short term sugarcane farmers who 
join credit programs (contract farmers) have 
advantages in terms of certainty. Without 
certainty, it is difficult for economic actors to 
make decisions. However, certainty by itself is 
not enough, because economic actors also 
want to get efficient institutional design. This 
institutional efficiency is assessed with the 
low transaction costs. Unfortunately, in some 
parts, forms of contract farmers’ institutions 
are less efficient as indicated by high 
transaction costs. On the other hand, non-
contract farmers’ institutions are more simple, 
because sugarcane farmers need not interact 
with many economic actors. However, 
collusion between middlemen and sugar mill 
staff (officers) makes it difficult for non-
contract farmers to submit their sugarcane to 
the sugar mill. In this respect, non-contract 
farmers’ institutional factors have weakness in 
the form of uncertainty, which contributes to 
high transaction costs. Therefore, certainty 
and institutional efficiency are two important 
things that have to be considered in reforming 
institutional design in the sugar industry. 
 Theoretically, the sources of this problem 
are incomplete contracts and lack of enfor-
cement. We can analyze incomplete contracts 
by two approaches. First, a version of incom-
plete contract theory, in which incompleteness 
is assumed to be the result of information 
asymmetries between contracting parties on 
the one hand, and third parties on the other 
hand. Second, a version of transaction cost 
economics, in which contractual incomple-
teness is assumed to be the result of this 
behavioral (opportunistic) assumption 
(Saussier, 2000:377-378). In the case of sugar-
cane farmers, incomplete contracts occurred 
because of the opportunistic behaviour of 
participants. We can identify lack of enforce-
ment as missing from self-enforcing contracts. 
Understood very loosely, all contracts can be 
said to be self-enforcing in that they always 
involve mechanisms for implementing 
clauses, for solving distributes, and for 
penalizing the responsible party in case of 
breach (Ménard, 2000:242). In the case of a 
sugarcane farmer’s contracts, self-enforcing 
contract is lacking because there are no 
detailed arrangements among participants; 
therefore, there is no punishment when either 
party breaks the agreement. 
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4. Relationship between Transaction Costs 
and Categorical Variables 
The above description has provided ade-
quate information about magnitude, variables, 
and proportions of sugarcane farmers’ tran-
saction costs. At least, the general conclusion 
can be drawn that the proportion of transaction 
costs is very high for sugarcane farmers, and 
even reaches almost 50% of total costs 
incurred by sugarcane farmers. However, 
these transaction costs exclude other difficult 
(implicit) variables; therefore, transaction cost 
data in this research is virtually lower than in 
reality. Finally, from all above explanations, 
there are some important points that state the 
relationship between transaction costs and 
categorical variables chosen, such as land tax, 
TMA (cut-load-carry), sack cost, cooperative 
fee and donation, credit interest, letter of 
delivery order fee (SPTA), interest margin, 
middleman fee, paperwork, opportunity costs, 
and credit delay. The following are some 
comments on the main findings: 
1. Kind of location. In the cases of some 
categorical variables the transaction costs 
differ according to the kind of location, i.e. 
Malang and Kediri Districts. First, the 
contribution of cooperative fees and 
donations in Kediri District is higher than 
that in Malang District. In Kediri District, 
cooperative donations were higher because 
there is only one cooperative, so that there 
is no other option for sugarcane farmers. 
Given such a monopoly, cooperatives may 
take high donations from their members 
with the hope that their sugarcane can be 
milled at sugar mills. This is different with 
Malang District, where there are many 
cooperatives so they cannot demand high 
donations from sugarcane farmers. If this 
happens, sugarcane farmers will move to 
other cooperatives which have lower 
donations. Therefore, new cooperatives in 
Kediri District need to be established. 
Second, the proportion of SPTA fees in 
Malang District is higher than that in 
Kediri District. According to the head of 
the technical unit in Kebon Agung Sugar 
Mill, most of the sugarcane farmers in 
Malang District are middleman. So, 
besides planting sugarcane, they are also 
traders (collecting other farmers’ sugar-
cane). As a result, there are some sugar-
cane farmers who find it difficult to get 
SPTA from sugar mills so that they must 
use middlemen to get their sugarcane 
milled in a sugar mill.  
2. Type of sugarcane farmers. Based on the 
type of sugarcane farmers, there are two 
transaction cost variables that differentiate 
between contract and non-contract farmers. 
First, percentage of cut-load-carry (TMA) 
costs (including transportation and sack 
costs) on contract farmers is higher than on 
non-contract farmers. The high proportion 
of TMA costs on contract farmers due to 
all processes are held by the sugar mill, so 
that there is an open possibility of 
manipulation because sugarcane farmers 
cannot control the cut-load-carry process. 
Conversely, on non-contract farmers, all 
TMA processes are organized by them-
selves so that the costs can be kept lower. 
Second, non-contract farmers are burdened 
with high transaction costs in paying a 
middleman fee, while contract farmers do 
not pay transaction costs for a middleman. 
The problem is simple: non-contract 
farmers must pay a middleman fee because 
they do not have access to sugar mills 
where their sugarcane can be milled. The 
middleman fee could be eliminated if 
officials (sugar mill) do not collude with 
middlemen to profit by hampering SPTA 
for non-contract farmers. 
3. Size of land. In general, the configuration 
of transaction costs is not influenced by 
variations in cultivated land size by 
sugarcane farmers. Land size influences 
production costs (through land rent) more 
than transaction costs. However, there is 
one interesting thing to observe: the 
proportion of land tax/ha to total 
transaction costs on sugarcane farmers who 
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have land >2 ha is smaller than for 
sugarcane farmers who have land 2 ha. 
There are two possible reasons for this: (i) 
because most landowners who have land 
>2 ha get land by renting, the possibilities 
of rent costs are paid by the landowner, not 
the renter (sugarcane farmers); and (ii) 
some sugarcane farmers who have land >2 
ha do not pay tax because it is customary 
in villages not to do so. The government 
(through village officials) is reluctant to 
take the tax because the amount of the tax 
is small. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLI-
CATIONS 
1. Conclusions  
From all explanations, there are some 
important conclusions that can be drawn about 
the transaction costs of sugarcane farmers. 
First, in general, the transaction costs 
percentage reaches almost 43% of total costs 
spent by sugarcane farmers; the remaining 
57% is production costs. If costs of land rent 
are excluded from production costs, then the 
composition of production and transaction 
costs is approximately in balance (50% : 
50%). This is true both in Malang and Kediri 
Districts, and for contract and non-contract 
farmers. Second, based on the location, 
transaction costs/ha in Kediri District are 
higher than in Malang District. This is caused 
by factors such as the following: (i) total 
cooperatives in Malang District are many, so 
the opportunity to manipulate is limited; (ii) 
for non-contract farmers in Kediri District 
almost all molasses is taken by a middleman 
so it becomes part of farmers’ transaction 
costs; and (iii) transportation costs are higher 
in Kediri District because its sugar/ha 
productivity is higher than in Malang District.  
Third, there is not a significant difference 
between transaction costs and sugarcane 
farmer’s type. However, transaction costs of 
non-contract farmers tend to be higher than for 
contract farmers. Transactions costs of 
contract farmers derive from contributions 
taken by cooperatives, opportunity costs, 
credit delay, and other illegal fees; whereas 
transaction costs of non-contract farmers are 
from high interest (more than 40%) and all 
molasses being taken by a middleman 
(because he has helped deliver sugarcane to 
the sugar mill). Fourth, in general, the confi-
guration of transaction costs is not actually 
influenced by different sizes of land processed 
by a sugar mill. Land size has more influence 
on production costs (through land rent 
variable) than on transaction costs. There is 
one interesting thing to observe, which is that 
the proportion of land tax/ha to total 
transaction costs on sugarcane farmers who 
have land >2 ha is smaller than for sugarcane 
farmers who have land 2 ha. However, those 
with more land should pay higher land tax.  
2. Policy Implications 
Although the findings of this study 
indicate that different institutional designs 
have different impacts on the magnitude and 
configuration of transaction costs, some 
important policy implications can be derived 
from the experience of the sugar industry in 
East Java – Indonesia. The following key 
lessons may foster a transaction cost econo-
mics perspective that envisages the contractual 
arrangements for sugar industry parties. The 
implications are expected to provide useful 
information to policy makers and economic 
actors in the sugar industry, particularly for 
the future design and implementation of other 
contractual arrangements of the sugar 
industry:   
1. APTR should be empowered as a sugar-
cane farmers’ representative that works for 
their interests. The most important agenda 
is reforming APTR staff that are, at this 
point, dominated by ‘leaf farmers’ (far-
mers who do not have sugarcane plants at 
all, but work only as sugarcane middle-
men). APTR staff must be filled by ‘root 
farmers,’ farmers whose sole activity is 
planting sugarcane, since they represent 
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the majority of sugarcane farmers in 
Indonesia.  
2. Cooperatives should be restructured as 
institutions that help sugarcane farmers to 
get information, guidance/supervision, 
cheap seed/fertilizer, and credit quickly 
and at low interest, so that they can support 
the decline of production and transaction 
costs. So far the functions of cooperatives 
are only to distribute credit and fertilizer, 
but the imposition of high interest/deduc-
tions may generate high transaction costs 
for sugarcane farmers.  
3. The government must open access for 
sugarcane farmers to be able to get credit 
from banks, especially for non-contract 
farmers (who are not bound in contract 
with a cooperative/sugar mill), so that they 
do not rely on getting their credit from a 
middleman with high interest (more than 
40%). It is hoped that this can decrease 
transaction costs borne by sugarcane 
farmers, especially non-contract farmers.  
4. There is a need to establish an intermediary 
institution that can be trusted by sugarcane 
farmers and sugar mills to determine sugar 
content. The problem is that sugarcane 
farmers cannot control the determination of 
sugar content because they do not have the 
technical capability. This demonstrates the 
importance of an intermediary institution 
as a mediator of sugarcane farmers’ and 
sugar mills’ interests.2  
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